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I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is widely credited with
resuscitating' the 1789 Alien Tort Statute ("ATS")2 in its landmark 1980
decision, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it
addressed the liability of corporations for violations of customary
international law and fundamentally altered decades of human rights
litigation. Since Filartiga, the Second Circuit has been known for deciding
I See, e.g., Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation and Transnational Business, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUsT. 745,
746 (2010); Marc Gottridge & Matthew Galvin, The ATS: An Introduction and Current Topics, 826 PLI/LiT 87, 89
(2010).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012): "The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, conmmitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The ATS is
also referred to by the courts as the "Alien Tort Claims Act" ("ATCA"), and the names are used interchangeably
in some opinons.
3 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights" and that the ATS provided
subject matter jurisdiction).
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
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ATS cases.' The court entered into uncharted and controversial territory'
though, as it attempted to deal with a claim made by a group of Nigerian
plaintiffs who alleged that "Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations
engaged in oil exploration and production aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in committing violations of the law of nations"' so as to promote
their exploratory efforts.' In ultimately determining that corporate
liability does not exist under the ATS,' the Second Circuit majority
misconstrued its own precedent and that of other circuits, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,o the
principles and goals of international law, scholarly commentary, and the
earliest available interpretations of the ATS. The plaintiffs sought review
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
After having the case on its docket for more than two years," the
Supreme Court's long-awaited decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.12 ultimately allowed the Second Circuit result to stand,' albeit on
different grounds.1 4 That the Supreme Court took so long to decide
Kiobel, and that its short-yet-divided opinion did little more than cloud
s See Lori Delaney, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation: The Second Circuit Fails to Set a
Threshold for Corporate Alien Tort Liability, 25 Nw. J. IN r't L. & Bus. 205, 208 (2004); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at
116. A representative sample of ATS cases decided by the Second Circuit includes: Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233 (2d Cit. 2003); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Vietnam Ass'n
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
6 But see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir.
2009) (assuming that corporations may be liable for violations of customary international law).
7 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 189-90 (Leval, J., concurring). It was said at one point that the defendants' "smooth economic
activities" could not continue without increased "ruthless military operations." Id.
9 Id. at 148-49 (majority opinion).
io 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Sosa was unanimous, but it drew a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia
(oined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and justice Thomas) and one fromJustice Breyer. Justice Scalia took issue with
what he saw as a "reservation of discretionary power in the Federal judiciary" in regards to the ATS. Id. at 739.
Justice Breyer would add a "further consideration" to the Court's ATS decision and ask "whether the exercise of
jurisdiction under the ATS is consistent with those notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the
sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement." Id. at 761.
11 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future of Alien Tort
Litigation, FORBES, (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-
observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-of-alien-tort-litigation/.
12 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). Of note, and much like its sole ATS predecessor, Sosa, the court in Kiobel was
divided and spawned a majority opinion along with three concurrences.
13 Id. at 1669.
14 Id. (applying the presumption against the extraterritorial application of United States law); see also
discussion infra Part V.
2013]1 283
284 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 21:281
the already muddy waters of corporate ATS liability,'" speaks volumes of
the importance that a final resolution on the issue of corporate liability
under the ATS come from the body that first enacted the statute more
than two centuries ago. The decision on whether corporations can be
subjects of international law under the ATS is also too important a matter
to be left to the final decision of judges.'" While the Second Circuit's
interpretation was wrong, and while the Supreme Court skirted the issue,
the final resolution-whether the ATS applies to or exempts
corporations-should ultimately be a congressional one."
The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789m-the same
act which gave rise to a famous congressional overreach.' 9 The Second
Circuit panel quoted Judge Friendly who said that it is a "'legal
Lohengrin'-'no one seems to know whence it came."'20 Summarizing
the court's holding in Filartiga, the panel noted that the ATS supports
jurisdiction for tort claims brought by aliens for violations of the law of
nations or "customary international law."2 ' It is clear that there is
essentially no suggestion of any original legislative intent in its
enactment.2 2 The Supreme Court has said that it was "enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
i5 See, e.g., Kristin Linsley Myles and James Rutten, Kiobel commentary: Answers . . . and more questions,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-kiobel-answers-
and-more-questions/.
16 The Court's opinion notes this in its discussion of the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of United States laws. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
17 It is not the goal or purpose of this note to delve too deeply into the Supreme Court's decision in
Kiobel. Without doubt, the fractured nature of that opinion will spawn numerous scholarly works in the months
to come. As stated, this note argues that regardless of the Supreme Court's opinion, the issue of corporate tort
liability under the ATS should be a congressional determination and one not left to the individual circuits or
district courts. Two noted scholars have suggested that the power to determine the applicability of the ATS
belongs to Congress. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Universal jurisdiction,
FORBEs (Apr. 21, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/21/the-supreme-court-
unanimously-rejects-uriversal-jurisdiction ("This common sense rule reserves for the political branches the
crucial right to weigh the foreign policy consequences of subjecting foreign conduct to U.S. law. It also gives
Congress a chance to determine whether it wants to give private plaintiffs the power to enforce such norms or
keep it in its traditional home, the President and the executive branch.").
is See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
i9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 139-40 (1803).
20 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cit. 2010) (quoting IIT v. Vencap,
Inc., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
21 Id. at 116 n.3 (the court explained that the terms are synonymous (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 414 F. 3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2003) and The Estrella, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 298, 307 (1819))).
22 See Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 1, at 89.
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personal liability at the time [of enactment]." 2 3 Justice Souter, in Sosa,
recognized that "the birth of the modern line of [ATS] cases [began]
with Filartga v. Pena-Irala."" The Filartiga decision has been credited with
bringing the ATS back into relevance. The Kiobel opinions have brought
the ATS fully into the spotlight and highlight the need for action.
In Part II, this note will introduce and analyze other important ATS
cases. First, it will examine the series of ATS cases decided by the Second
Circuit, starting with Filartiga and culminating with its opinion in
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.25 This will be followed
by a review of ATS cases decided in other circuits. Part II will also include
an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
since, prior to Kiobel, it was the only case decided by the Court under the
ATS.26 That portion will focus on the majority's treatment of the ATS as
well as highlight important points made by Justices Scalia and Breyer in
their respective concurrences-all very important in fully understanding
the state of the law on corporate ATS liability.
Despite the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Second Circuit's
judgment, the fact that it declined to decide the issue of corporate liability
means that the panel's discussion of corporate ATS liability remains
important. Therefore, Part III will provide an overview of the Second
Circuit judges' opinions in Kiobel in order to demonstrate the arguments
and introduce the most contentious issues. Part IV will analyze the
majority and concurring opinions' treatment of Sosa as well as their
respective treatment of appellate precedent. Part IV will also analyze the
judges' readings of both customary international law and scholarly
commentary. In Part V, this note will turn to the Supreme Court's long-
awaited decision in this case and what it means for ATS litigation going
forward. The note will then conclude with a critique of the Second
Circuit and Supreme Court Kiobel opinions, some comments on the
future of corporate ATS liability, and a call to action that highlights the
importance of congressional intervention.
2 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
24 Id. at 724-25.
25 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
26 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
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II. DEVELOPING A CONTEXT: THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE IN THE COURTS
A. Adopting an Orphan: The Second Circuit and the ATS
1. Breaking New Ground
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Paraguayan citizens brought suit against the
Inspector General of the Paraguayan police for the torture and death of
the son of one of the plaintiffs in alleged retaliation for the father's
political activities.27 The complaint was initially dismissed for lack of
subject-matter junisdiction.2 8 The panel held that "deliberate torture
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the
nationality of the parties."29 Therefore, the ATS provided jurisdiction.
The defendants challenged the statute's constitutionality, but the
court rejoined that Congress had the power to enact it because anything
related to the law of nations was within federal common law powers.o
The court cited Blackstone for historical reinforcement." Concluding
that the dismissed claims had to be reversed, the court eloquently opined
that "[iun the twentieth century the international community has come
to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic
human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture," and that the
holding "is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence."3 2 The judicial resuscitation
of the ATS had begun.
2. Jurisdiction Over Non-State Actors for Genocide
In Kadic v. Karadzic," the plaintiffs were ethnic minorities from the
former Yugoslavia" allegedly subjected to "rape, forced prostitution,
forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution" as part of a
"genocidal campaign conducted in the course of the Bosnian civil war" by
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 Id.
29 Id.
0 Id. at 885.
31 Id. at 886.
32 Id. at 890.
33 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
34 Id. at 236.
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the defendant, the president of a self-proclaimed republic." The trial
court dismissed the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 6
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the ATS." The
defendant argued that the ATS did not cover non-state actors, and that he,
as the leader of merely a "self-proclaimed" state, was technically a non-
state actor.38 The unanimous panel disagreed with this assessment of the
ATS, and it held that violations of the law of nations are violations
independent of state or non-state actor status.3 ' The court allowed ATS
jurisdiction over non-state actors and reversed the dismissal of the
complaint.40
3. Suits Against Corporations
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd.4 1 could have preempted Kiobel,
but the defendant did not raise the defense of corporate liability, and so
the court did not decide it.4 2 In Khulumani, South African citizens alleged
that a corporation acted in concert with the South African government to
sustain apartheid.43 The trial court dismissed the complaints for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction." The Second Circuit panel vacated the
order." In a concurrence cited often in Kiobel, Judge Katzmann noted
that he felt that the trial court erred by "conflat[ing] the jurisdictional
and cause of action analyses required by the ATCA" and by disallowing a
claim for aiding and abetting apartheid under international law." He also
noted that the circuit seemed to consistently view individual and
corporate liability in the same light." Another judge concurred in the
dismissal, but argued that corporations should not be liable under the
ATS.48 Nevertheless, the suit proceeded-the corporate liability defense
3s Id. at 236-37.
36 Id. at 236.
3 Id. at 238.
38 Id. at 239.
3 Id.
40 Id. at 251.
41 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
42 Id. at 282-83 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (since the defendants did not raise the issue, the court did
not decide whether corporations are liable under customary international law).
3 Id. at 258.
44 Id. at 259.
45 Id. at 260 (2-1 opinion).
46 Id. at 264 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 282-83.
48 Id. at 292 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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neither argued nor decided.
4. Assuming Corporate Liability Under the Law of Nations
The plaintiffs in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.49
were Sudanese citizens who alleged that the defendant aided and abetted
human rights abuses by the Sudanese government,so specifically torture,
war crimes, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity." The
complaint was dismissed by the trial court for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under the ATS. 5 2 Finding that the complaint had no
suggestion of intentional involvement, the panel, which consisted of Chief
Judge Jacobs and Judges Cabranes and Leval, affirmed." While the claims
had to be dismissed, the court opined in a footnote that "[w]e will also
assume, without deciding, that corporations such as Talisman may be held
liable for the violations of customary international law."" Prior to Kiobel,
this was the furthest that the Second Circuit gone in addressing corporate
tort liability under the law of nations.
B. The ATS Across America
1. The Ninth Circuit: The Corporate Mindset
In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,5 5 the plaintiffs "allege[d] that the Defendants
directly or indirectly subjected the villagers to forced labor, murder, rape,
and torture when the Defendants constructed a gas pipeline through the
Tenasserim region [of Myanmar]."" The court addressed the meaning of
"the law of nations" and the allegations.s" It said that a "threshold
question in any ATCA case against a private party, such as Unocal, is
whether the alleged tort requires the private party to engage in state
action for ATCA liability to attach . "5
The ATS-related allegation in Doe I was forced labor.5 ' The court
49 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
5 Id. at 247.
st Id. at 253.
52 Id. at 247.
53 Id. at 247-48.
54 Id. at 261 n.12.
ss 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
5 Id. at 936.
57 Id. at 944-45.
ss Id. at 945.
9 Id. at 947.
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drew guidance from the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic,
and held that certain crimes "do not require state action when committed
in furtherance of other crimes.""o The court looked to its precedent and
found that "forced labor is a modem variant of slavery" and "is among the
'handful of crimes . . . to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability . . ' "61 The court used evidentiary standards as propounded by
recent international criminal tribunals to determine how international law
views aiding and abetting.62 The panel held that a jury could find the
relevant actus reus6 3 and mens rea64 of aiding and abetting forced labor,
and it reversed summary judgment. 5 Preceding an en banc hearing,6 6 the
case was settled out of court6' and dismissed.68
2. The Eleventh Circuit: ATS Textualism
In Romero v. Drummond Co."9 the plaintiffs alleged that a corporate
defendant paid to have members of a Colombian trade union tortured."
The defendant argued that the ATS does not allow suits against
corporations," but the court easily dispatched with that, stating that
"[t]he text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express exception for
corporations . . ." and it observed that "the law of this Circuit is that this
60 Id. at 945-46.
61 Id. at 946 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring)).
62 Id. at 950.
63 Id. at 952 ("[P]ractical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime of, in the present case, forced labor.").
64 Id. at 953 ("[Aictual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice's actions will
assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.").
65 Id.
6 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). While the opinion granting the hearing
ordered that the "panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the
Ninth Circuit, except to the extent adopted by the en banc court," id. at 979, the rationale was nonetheless
accepted by three circuit judges. See Doe 1, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("As to that [ATS], I
agree with the majority that material factual disputes exist regarding plaintiffs' claims for forced labor used in
connection with the Yadana Pipeline Project. I also agree with the majority that if plaintiffs prove their
allegations, Unocal may be held liable under the Act for the use of forced labor ..... ). Thus, its arguments are
worth considering.
67 See Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TiMr~s, Dec. 14, 2004, http://articles.latimes.
com/2004/dec/14/business/fi-unocall4.
6 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
69 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
7o Id. at 1308-09.
71 Id. at 1314.
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statute grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate
defendants."" The panel was referring to Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A., Inc.," where a panel held that a corporate defendant could
be liable for torture under the ATS." The blanket defense of
incorporation, as argued by Drummond, was not even raised by the
defendant," nor discussed by the panel. Combining the plain text of the
ATS and its own case history, the panel had no trouble finding corporate
liability.
C. The Supreme Court Enters the Game
1. Setting the Standard
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain," Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez")
was indicted by a federal grand jury for torturing and killing a United
States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") operative in Mexico.7 7 After
the United States government tried unsuccessfully to get help from the
Mexican government to apprehend him, it decided to employ a group of
Mexican citizens to seize him.7 8 He was taken from his home, kept in a
hotel overnight, and then flown to Texas where he was arrested, tried, and
acquitted.7 1 Alvarez sued his kidnapper and several DEA agents under the
ATS.so How the Court handled the ATS claim is of vital importance in
the forthcoming discussion of how the Second Circuit panel misconstrued
the Supreme Court's rationale in Sosa.
The trial judge gave summary judgment to Alvarez."' The decision
was affirmed by a panel of the Ninth Circuit;82 a deeply divided en banc
circuit also affirmed it." The en banc majority applied circuit ATS
precedent to hold that it "not only provides federal courts with subject
72 Id. at 1315.
7 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
7 Id. at 1253.
7s See generally Defendants' Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No. 01-3399-Civ-Moreno), 2002 WL
32707307.
76 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
77 Id. at 697.
78 Id. at 698.
7' Id.
s0 Id. (Alvarez also brought a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act but that is not relevant here.).
81 Id. at 699.
82 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001).
83 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (6-5 decision).
CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY
matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action for an alleged
violation of the law of nations."" The majority recognized "a clear and
universally accepted norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention ....
codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and is
reflected in at least 119 national constitutions. "s8 Thus, the arrest and
detention violated the law of nations." The DEA petitioned the Supreme
Court, and the Court granted certiorari."
The Court's opinion was fractured." In Part III, Justice Souter
addressed Alvarez's claim that the ATS not only gave jurisdiction to the
federal courts to hear claims for violations of the law of nations, but also
gave them the power to create new causes of action for violations of
international law." As to the jurisdictional claim, Justice Souter noted
that § 1350 was placed in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, a section devoted
to federal jurisdiction.90 Justice Souter called the origination argument
"implausible." 9 ' For further evidence of the intended nature of the ATS,
Justice Souter cited a commentator who wrote that "[the ATS] clearly
does not create a statutory cause of action."9 2 Thus, the Court found that
the ATS was intended to "address[] the power of the courts to entertain
cases concerned with a certain subject."9 3
Justice Souter then moved to a discussion of the "law of nations" as
the term was understood in 1789." Referring to Blackstone, Justice
Souter found that English law narrowed the law of nations to the
"violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy. "9 He concluded that this was likely considered by the first
Congress when it enacted the statute.96
84 Id. at 612.
as Id. at 620.
86 Id.
87 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003).
88 The Court's opinion was unanimous as to Parts I and 111. Part II of the Court's opinion analyzed the
FTCA claim. Part IV gamered just 6 votes and was challenged by the concurrence ofJustice Scalia, along with
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
89 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (quoting William Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of
the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. Rav. 467, 479 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 Id. at 714.
94 Id. at 714-15.
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He observed that the Continental Congress was concerned with such
issues but failed to get the individual states to provide appropriate
remedies.9 7 The new government dealt with this problem by vesting the
federal judiciary with power under the ATS.9"
Bemoaning the fact that there is virtually no congressional record or
legislative history relevant to the ATS, Justice Souter looked to the
writings of commentators and concluded that "a consensus understanding
of what Congress intended has proven elusive."9 9
He then explained that the history of the ATS allows two
inferences.' The first is that the statute is seemingly self-executing in that
it does not require any future act of Congress to vest it with any further
authority.' 0 ' Justice Souter made further note of Congress' attentiveness
to the law of nations as discussed by Blackstone.' 02 The other inference
Justice Souter drew is that the ATS was designed to "furnish jurisdiction
for a relatively modest set of actions" and that, according to Blackstone,
such offenses typically involved states not individuals.'0 o
Continuing the quest for a historical understanding of the ATS,
Justice Souter discussed the opinion of an Attorney General, who, in 1795
"made it clear that a federal court was open for a tort" resulting from
Americans who aided "the French plunder of a British slave colony in
Sierra Leone."' Justice Souter felt that he must have presumed the ATS
to provide jurisdiction for common law claims.'o Ultimately, Justice
Souter determined that Congress intended the ATS to have "practical
[jurisdictional] effect" and that it would provide a cause of action limited
to the "modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time."' 0 6
In Part IV, Justice Souter set out the standard for evaluating ATS
claims.'0 7 He noted that the present version of the ATS was substantially
the same as its original version.'os Justice Souter held that courts hearing
9 Id. at 715-16.
98 Id. at 717.
9 Id. at 718-19.
i0 Id. at 719.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 720.
104 Id. at 721 (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795)).
105 Id.
i0 Id. at 724.
107 Id. at 724-25.
1os Id. at 725.
CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY
ATS claims for violations of the law of nations should ensure that such
claims "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world" which is "defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms [the Court, noting Blackstone] has
recognized."'" 9
He said that "judicial caution" is important in ATS suits because there
is tremendous room for interpretation of international norms under this
rule." 0 Justice Souter cited Erie v. Tomkins's impact on federal common
law and opined that the Court has been exceedingly wary of major
alterations of substantive law by courts as opposed to legislatures."' He
wrote that the Court has adhered to legislatively-created causes of action,
with the judiciary having little or no role therein.1 2 He commanded that
courts consider the Executive's role in foreign relations and how
interference by the courts in allowing new claims by aliens could hurt
international relations."' Justice Souter cautioned that there is "no
congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations."" 4 Lastly, Justice Souter noted that the
Senate, in ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992,
"expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
applying international human rights law.""' The Court's mandate is firm
but appropriate.
Justice Souter then turned to the criticisms raised by Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion."' 6 In response to Justice Scalia's desire to "close the
door" to ATS claims beyond those explicitly noted by Blackstone, he
cited several cases to show that American law has always been, not only
open to, but bound by, international legal norms."' Some examples
include:
* "[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts apply
international law as a part of our own in appropriate
i0 Id. (emphasis added).
Ito Id. at 725-26.
M Id. at 726 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 708).
112 Id. at 727.
113 Id. at 727-28.
114 Id. at 728.
15 Id.
"6 Id. at 728-29.
"7 Id. at 729-30.
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circumstances;"8
* "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination;"" 9 and
* "[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part
of the law of the land." 12 0
He argued that these statements support the proposition that American
law should be open to new international norms beyond those recognized
at Blackstone's time.121 justice Souter's comment that "the position [the
Court] takes today has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years,
ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala . . . ." is very
appropriate here.12 2
Lastly, Justice Souter outlined the Court's criteria for determining
whether a particular claim is sufficient under the ATS.123 He looked to a
case from 1820 that described the specificity with which "piracy" was
defined under international law.124 justice Souter held that "claims for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted" should not lie.125 Furthermore,
such a calculation "should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that
cause available to litigants in the federal courts."1 26 The element of
discretion is thus very important.
In Footnote 20, a footnote that will be brought up repeatedly in
Kiobel, Justice Souter added: "A related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such
118 Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1' Id. at 730 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120 Id. (quoting The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121 Id. at 730-31.
122 Id. at 731.
123 Id. at 731-32.
124 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)).
125 Id. at 732.
126 Id. at 732-33.
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as a corporation or individual."1 27 Also therein, Justice Souter noted a
1984 District of Columbia Circuit case' 28  found an "insufficient
consensus . . . that torture by private actors violates international law"
while a 1995 Second Circuit casel 29 found a "sufficient consensus . . . that
genocide by private actors violates international law."' 3 0 Justice Souter
said that Alvarez tried to argue that his situation constituted a violation of
customary international law, but, like the first example, he did not make a
compelling case.''
Even more went against Alvarez in this regard as Justice Souter
referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States inferring that "[a]ny credible invocation of a principle
against arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as binding
customary international law requires a factual basis beyond relatively brief
detention in excess of positive authority."13 2 He summarized Alvarez's
claim as aspirational and lacking in specificity.13 3 Thus, the claim was
insufficient to establish a violation of customary international law and was
therefore jurisdictionally deficient insofar as the ATS is concerned.134
2. "One Further Consideration": justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
After he summarized the majority's holding, Justice Breyer stated that
he wished to add an additional criterion to the court's analysis.13 5 Justice
Breyer said that courts should consider "whether the exercise of
jurisdiction under the ATS is consistent with those notions of comity that
lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by
limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement" and how this fits in
an increasingly "interdependent world."' 3 ' He views this as a way to
ensure that the application of the ATS by American courts helps, and does
not hurt, international relations. ' His concern for comity stems
127 Id. at 732 n.20.
128 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
129 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1994).
130 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
131 See id. at 726; see also id. at 726 n.27.
132 Id. at 737.
133 Id. at 738.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 760-61 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 761.
137 Id.
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especially from suits arising abroad.138 Justice Breyer noted that
international law may reflect a universal agreement that certain kinds of
behavior should be prosecuted including torture, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.' 3 9 Justice Breyer argued that because such an
agreement exists it makes sense for various nations to allow civil
prosecution for these (and, of course, others which may fit in the limited
category) infractions.14 0 While he noted that this traditionally concerns
criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction over the same matters should work
just the same.141 Because many foreign criminal tribunals combine civil
and criminal matters, "universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well."' 4 2 Justice
Breyer found no sufficient consensus in regards to the present issue, and he
restated his conclusion that the ATS precluded Alvarez's suit.14 3
3. Going Too Far: Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia declined to join Part IV of the majority opinion because
it called for the "reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal
Judiciary to create causes of action for the enforcement of international-
law-based norms."' 44 He termed it a "judicial lawmaking role."1 45 In light
of these concerns, his opinion deserves mention.
Justice Scalia said that the point of departure between his opinion and
the majority's is the element of judicial discretion.146 Such federal
common law power, he pointed out, was destroyed by Erie v. Tomkins and
the Court's decision seems to allow for the kind of judicial lawmaking
that would not have been considered at the time of the ATS's
enactment.1 4 7
Justice Scalia's overarching concerns dealt with the potential
expansion of judicial lawmaking and the lessening of the grip of judicial
138 Id.
13 Id. at 762 (referring to Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, P155-56 (Dec. 10, 1998),




142 Id. at 762-63.
143 Id. at 763.
144 Id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14s Id.
146 Id. at 744.
147 Id. at 744-45.
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restraint. 148 He said that Kadic v. Karadzic'49 is an example of a court
finding a cause of action based on an international norm even though
Congress had enacted a statute conforming to the norm and specifically
saying that courts were not to create any new rights.15o Justice Scalia
concluded that the law of nations-based creation of new civil claims is a
"20th-century invention of international law professors and human rights
activists," and that the Founders would be "appalled" by the kind of
discretion authorized by the majority to apply international nornis to
American law.' 5 1 Justice Scalia's observations are not lost here, since the
hearing of American courts of such suits would bring about a massive
increase in litigation, but even under Justice Scalia's well-known judicial
philosophy, Originalism, the ATS would seem to apply to
corporations.1 52
With this understanding of the Supreme Court's ATS rationale
identified, and with the relevant concerns and considerations noted, it is
now time to analyze the Second Circuit's opinion in Kiobel.
III. KIOBEL v. RoYAL DuTce PETROLEUM Co.
A. Factual Allegations
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,' the plaintiffs alleged that
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company ("Royal Dutch") and Shell Transport
and Trading Company ("Shell"), through a subsidiary, aided and abetted
the Nigerian government in perpetrating human rights abuses in violation
of the law of nations to aid the companies' oil exploration.' 5 4
Shortly after the exploratory efforts began, the people of the Ogoni
region, where these events took place, organized the Movement for
148 See id. at 747-48.
149 See supra Part II.A.2.
1so Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748-49.
'1 Id. at 749-50.
152 See, e.g., Max Kennedy, Originalism and Corporate Personhood Meet The Alien Tort Statute, LIIG. &
TRIAL (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2012/02/articles/series/special-comment/alien-tort-
statute/; Michael Ramsey, The Original Meaning of the Alien Tort Statute, Continued, Tvi-n ORIGINALISM BLOG
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://originaismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2012/03/the-original-meaning-of-
the-alien-tort-statute-continuednichael-ramsey.html.
1s3 621 F.3d I1 (2d Cir. 2010).
154 Id. at 189 (Leval, J., concurring); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d.
457, 464-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Plaintiffs' claims were "Extrajudicial Killings," "Crimes Against Humanity,"
"Torture/Cruel, Inhuman and degrading Treatment," "Arbitrary Arrest and Detention," "Rights to Life, Liberty,
Security and Assocation," "Forced Exile," and "Property Destruction.").
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Survival of Ogoni People, ("MOSOP") and began to protest the presence
of the companies.'15 The plaintiffs alleged that since 1993 the companies
funded and directed a military campaign by the Nigerian government to
suppress the protestors.' 5 6 They also alleged that the companies met to
"formulate a strategy to suppress" the Ogonis which included help from
the Nigerian government in the form of various raids and attacks carried
out by the military giving money, shelter, and food in trade for greater
security for their drilling operations.s 7 When this was not enough to
suppress the protestors, the military created a special forces-type brigade
which, over a four-month span:
[B]roke into homes, shooting or beating anyone in their path,
including the elderly, women and children, raping, forcing
villagers to pay 'settlement fees,' bribes and ransoms to secure
their release, forcing villagers to flee and abandon their homes,
and burning, destroying or looting property, and killed at least
fifty Ogoni residents.'
Members of MOSOP were held without charges or hearings, sometimes
for over a month.' They were allegedly beaten and given insufficient
rations and other important services.16 0 Following their arrests, members
of MOSOP were tried and convicted (in a court system allegedly
controlled by Royal Dutch and Shell) and then executed.''
B. Procedural Posture
The defendants moved to disniss the complaint by alleging its failure
to meet the specificity required by Sosa.162 The court noted the vagueness
in Sosa, and analyzed the claims "on the assumption that the Filartiga [v.
Pena-Irala] holding controls, and [said it would] dismiss claims only
where they clearly run afoul of Sosa."' 6 The court relied on Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., and determined that if something
were a violation of the law of nations, aiding and abetting that crime was a
155 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 189.
156 Id.
15 Id.





163 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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crime, too.'6 4
The court dismissed several claims,1s but it also allowed a few of the
plaintiffs' claims to go forward.' 6 6  In an exercise of wise and prudent
judgment, the District Court certified its decision to the Court of Appeals
because it felt that there existed "substantial ground for difference of
opinion" regarding post-Sosa ATS claims.' 67
C. The Majority Opinion
The court began by discussing its history with the ATS, noting the
unique and complex nature of such claims.'16  Judge Cabranes noted that
as recently as 2009 the court had heard cases involving corporate
defendants.' 6 ' The applicable legal standard, he said, is to determine
whether "absent a relevant treaty of the United States . . . a plaintiff
bringing an ATS suit against a corporation has alleged a violation of
customary international law."' In construing Footnote 20 from Sosa, he
concluded that customary international law does not recognize corporate
liability and held that corporations are not seen as subjects amenable to
suit under international law."' Thus, these allegations cannot come under
164 Id. at 463-64.
15 Among these were claims for "Property Damage," id. ("[P]roperty destruction committed as part of
genocide or war crimes, and not property destruction alone violates the law of nations," but that since "Plaintiffs
have not alleged genocide or war crimes. ... Plaintiffs' claim for property destruction is dismissed."); "Forced
Exile," id. ("The Court is unaware of any federal court decision in which a court has considered, much less
allowed, a claim for forced exile pursuant to the ATS. In light of Sosa's limiting principles, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs' claim for forced exile."); "Rights to Life, Liberty, Security and Association," id. ("[N]o particular or
universal understanding of the civil and political rights [as alleged in the claim]."); and "Extrajudicial Killings" id.
at 464-65 ("Plaintiffs have not directed the Court to any international authority establishing the elements of
extrajudicial killing, and the Court is aware of none.").
16 These claims were for "Torture/Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment," id. ("Although Sosa
does not delineate which forms of torture are actionable under the ATS, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs'
allegations (taken together, ifnot alone) are sufficient to state a claim."); "Arbitrary Arrest and Detention," id. at
465-66 (The court reached this conclusion by inferring from Sosa's holding that a single day's detention was
insufficient to raise a claim of detention under the ATS that a detention lasting a much longer time, in this case,
up to a year, could be enough to bring an ATS claim and therefore let this claim proceed.); and "Crimes Against
Humanity," id. at 467 ("Where, as here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged claims for torture and arbitrary
detention, . .. and have also alleged that these crimes were committed as part of an intentional, systematic attack
against a particular civilian population, a claim for crimes against humanity is actionable under the ATS.") (citing
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002))).
167 Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
168 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2010).
i69 Id. at 117 n.10.
17o Id. at 118.
171 Id. at 120.
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the ATS's jurisdiction. 17 2 Not only is there no norm for such jurisdiction,
he said, there is actually authority against such a practice.1 3
Judge Cabranes noted the circuit's ATS history and the fact that it had
heretofore decided cases involving corporations but that it had explicitly
passed on deciding whether the defendants were actually liable-even in
cases where it allowed the suit to proceed against the corporate
defendant. 7 4 He explained that these prior assumptions had no bearing
on the present case, and proceeded to outline the court's two-part
analysis."' The first step is to "consider which body of law governs the
question-international law or domestic law;" the second is to "consider
what the sources of international law reveal with respect to whether
corporations can be subject to liability for violations of customary
international law."' 7 6
Judge Cabranes looked at the language in Sosa concerning "modest
number[s] of international law violations" and "norms . . . accepted by
the civilized world.""'7  He concluded that international law is the source
to look to for ATS suits. 78
He then looked to whether international law governs the matter of
those who are subjects of international law.' 7 Judge Cabranes noted that
subjects of international law have "legal status, personality, rights, and
duties under international law."' He concluded that it is the province of
international law, not individual states, to define subjects.' 8 ' Starting with
the Nazi prosecutions at Nuremburg, he said that individuals are subjects
of international law.'8 2 He found that international law retains the
exclusive power to determine who is subject to its authority. 8 3
Judge Cabranes held that under Sosa the court is obliged to find
within the expanse of international law the standard for the appropriate
172 Id.
173 Id. at 121 n.21.
174 Id. at 124-25.
175 Id. at 125.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 126.
1' Id.
180 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
pt. II, at 70 introductory note) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 126-27.
183 Id. at 127.
CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY
type of actor subject to its authority.' He added that this is consistent
with circuit precedent that has often referenced international norms or
standards in answering ATS questions. 185 It is a conjunctive test where
liability must be determined for the allegation and the actor." Thus, the
court must determine whether, under international law, there is an
established norm under which corporate defendants can be liable.'
Beginning the search for the norm, Judge Cabranes cited Sosa for the
proposition that "a norm must be 'specific, universal, and obligatory'" to
apply to the ATS.' Furthermore, he noted that the Supreme Court
suggested that, in looking for international legal norms where there is no
other clearly labeled source; a court should give weight to the "works of
jurists and commentators. . . . [f]or trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.""'
Judge Cabranes's search for international legal norms began with the
Nuremburg trials.' 1 He noted that the tribunal was given authority over
"natural persons only," but also had the power to proclaim an organization
"criminal.""' Judge Cabranes pointed out that the tribunal, in a case
where a corporation had been deemed criminal, explicitly stated that it
was exercising jurisdiction over the employees, and that it was proscribed
from doing so as to the company itself.'9 2 He concluded that at least as of
the end of World War II, international law applied liability to states and
individuals, and explicitly not to corporations.'
Judge Cabranes then ventured into a discussion of international
tribunals in more recent years, looking at the one established to handle the
crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.194 In dealing with violations of
international humanitarian law, the tribunal was vested with authority
over "natural persons to the exclusion of juridical persons."' 9" Judge Cabranes
observed that the Rome Statute limits the jurisdiction of the International
184 Id. at 127-28.
18 Id. at 128.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 130.
18 Id. at 131 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
18 Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733-34) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Id. at 132-33.
191 Id. at 133.
192 Id. at 134.
19 Id. at 135-36.
194 Id. at 136.
195 Id. (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,
art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Criminal Court to "natural persons."' Noting that the Rome Statute, in
the words of a commentator, "implicitly negates-at least for its own
jurisdiction-the punishability of corporations and other legal entities," he
concluded that even the later tribunals do not recognize corporate liability
in regards to the law of nations."'
Moving from tribunals to treaties, Judge Cabranes recognized the
circuit's precedent that international law treaties are relevant when they
"will only constitute sufficient proof of a norm of customary international law
if an overwhelming majority of States have ratified the treaty."' He
noted that some treaties have extended liability to corporate actors, but say
nothing of their applicability to human rights violations.'" He also found
"no historical evidence of an existing or even nascent norm of customary
international law imposing liability on corporations for violations of
human rights."20 0 Judge Cabranes concluded that there is an insufficient
basis to find a norm of international law regarding corporate liability. 2 0 1
As to the works of commentators, Judge Cabranes added that two
international law professors stated that customary international law does
not impose liability on corporations. 2 02 He noted that scholars supporting
corporate liability see it more as a goal to be achieved than as reality. 2 03
Finding a lack of a universal norm of corporate liability in the writings of
scholars, Judge Cabranes concluded that corporate liability is not a norm
under customary international law.20 4
Applying these conclusions as to the determination of applicable law,
and the scope of liability under international law, Judge Cabranes
concluded that, at least for the time being, there is no recognition within
the law of nations which accords liability to corporations for violations of
customary international laws.20 5
196 Id.
i9 Id. at 136-37 (quoting ALBIN ESER, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE 01
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT: A COMMENTARY 767, 778 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
i9 Id. at 137.
199 Id. at 139.
200 Id.
201 Id. (admitting that while there is an emerging trend, it is not a substantive one).
202 Id. at 143.
203 Id. at 144 n.48.
204 Id. at 145.
205 Id. at 149 (not disclosing the possibility that such liability could eventually become a norm of
customary international law).
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D. Judge Leval's Concurring Opinion
Judge Leval called the majority opinion overbroad and unjustified. 20 6
He stated that while he fully supported the dismissal of the claim, he
could not subscribe to the rule of law created by the majority.2 07 Judge
Leval said that the majonity opinion does significant damage to Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, as well as to human rights litigation.20 8
He began his literary assault of the majority opinion by suggesting that
international law would desire the rule that was explicitly rejected by the
majority. 209 Judge Leval noted examples of behavior that, under this rule,
would not face ATS liability due to the incorporated status of its
perpetrator. 2 10 Acknowledging the outrageous situations possible under
the court's holding, he stated that the "incompatibility of the majority's
rule with the objectives of international law does not conclude the
argument." 21 1
Judge Leval proposed that there is an "absence of any reason, purpose,
or objective for which international law might [adopt]" the majority's
rule.2 12 Noting that the world has encouraged the growth of juridical
entities by giving them all sorts of rights and powers, he concluded that to
allow this and then to hold the entities immune from suit would be
absurd.213
Judge Leval argued that the majority opinion did not rest on any legal
precedent 214 and cited various Second Circuit cases where corporate
liability was either assumed or not raised.2 15 He then referred to ATS cases
from other courts where corporate liability was challenged and upheld.2 16
He noted that a 1907 opinion said that "an American corporation could
be held liable under the ATS to Mexican nationals if the defendant's
'diversion of the water [of the Rio Grande] was an injury to substantial
206 Id. at 154.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 150-51.
209 Id. at 154.
210 Id. at 155-57 (a corporate entity engaged in slave trade and piracy).
211 Id. at 159.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 160 (citing Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in
the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'l Hum. Ris. 304, 322 (2008) ("I am not aware of any legal system in which
corporations cannot be sued for damages when they commit legal wrongs that would be actionable if committed
by an individual.")).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 161 n.12; see also supra Part IL.A.4.
216 Id. at 161 n.14. The importance of these decisions will be discussed infra in Part IV.C.
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rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of international law or by
treaty."' 2 17 Also, as early as 1795218 corporations were considered by the
Attorney General as subjects who could sue under the ATS. 2 19 Judge Leval
concluded that there is no support for the majority's holding in prior ATS
jurisprudence.
He addressed international tribunals and their relevance. 22 0 He found
that since they have been designed to handle criminal matters and do not
handle civil issues, the majority's argument that they have been denied
from handling such matters is meaningless.2 2 1
Turning to Footnote 20 in Sosa, Judge Leval asserted that the majority
misconstrued the meaning of the language therein concerning classes of
defendants.22 2 Judge Leval concluded that, on the contrary, the text does
not distinguish between types of private actors, and the only implication
from it suggests that the Court combined private defendants into one
class.223
Judge Leval discussed what he called "deficiencies of the majority's
reasoning." 2 24 He said that the argument that "Corporations face no
criminal liability under international law so there is no basis for their
having civil liability" is flawed. 22 5 Referring to the principle that criminal
law punishes intent, he saw no reason to apply criminal rationales to civil
law.226 He then quoted a member of the Rome Statute Drafting
Committee for the argument that:
[Diespite the diversity of views concerning corporate criminal
liability, 'all positions now accept in some form or another the
principle that a legal entity, private or public, can, through its
policies or actions, transgress a norm for which the law, whether
national or international, provides, at the very least damages. '227
Judge Leval argued that it is illogical to conclude, as the majority did, that
217 Id. (quoting 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 252, 253 (1907)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218 The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
219 Id. (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795)).
220 Id. at 163.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 163-64.
223 Id. at 165.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 166.
226 Id.
2 Id. at 168 (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 379
(2d rev. ed. 1999)) (second emphasis added).
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since criminal tribunals do not have jurisdiction over corporations that
corporations are not subjects of international law.2 28
Judge Leval then argued that international law leaves issues of civil
liability to the detenmination of the respective states.2 29 He mentioned
that Professor Oscar Schachter, a famed United Nations scholar, wrote
that while it is not necessary for states to allow damages for violations of
international law, it is generally left to them to determine what remedies
they wish to provide those seeking relief 2 3 0 As a final example in support
of this proposition, Judge Leval cited the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which calls upon states to
make "effective penalties" for such violations. 2 3 1 Thus, states are
permitted to select whichever remedy they deem more effective.23 2
Judge Leval continued with the contention that "the absence of
widespread agreement among the nations of the world to impose civil
liability on corporations means that they can have no liability under
international law." 2 33 Stating that he has no problem with the premises of
the argument, but only with its application, he proceeded to analyze each
proposition.23 4 First, he noted that "the place to look for answers whether
any set of facts constitutes a violation of international law is to
international law," 2 35 which is concerned with certain behaviors and
leaves remedies to the states.2 36 Further, he wrote that international law
does not absolve corporations of liability, and in line with this, allows
states to proscribe the relevant measures. 2 37 He asserted that the majority
opinion undermines the principle of international law that allows
individual states to create and enforce remedies for its violations.2 38
He addressed the premise that "principles of local law, even if
accepted throughout the world, are not rules of international law unless
they are generally accepted throughout the civilized world as obligatory
rules of international law"-its corollary being that "there is no
228 Id. at 170.
229 Id. at 171.
230 Id. at 172 (citing OSCAR SClIACHTFR, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN Ti-EORY AND PRACTIcE 2 (1991));
see also id. at 172 n.29.
23 Id. at 173.
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widespread practice in the world of imposing civil liability for violation of
the rules of international law" and that no civil liability exists. 239 Judge
Leval argued that an "award of damages under the ATS is not based on a
belief that international law commands [corporate] civil liability," and he
found it to be an irrelevant and unnecessary determination as to whether
international law requires corporate violators to be liable.24 0 Similarly, he
noted that there is no international consensus stipulating that individuals
are liable in tort for similar violations.24 1
Next, Judge Leval restated his claim that the majority misinterpreted
Sosa to require international norms to extend precisely to the type of actor
making the type of violation and the manner of assessing liability. 24 2
Noting that a majority of the Supreme Court in Sosa supported awarding
damages under the ATS, he pointed out that this would make no sense if
the Court were to require unanimity among nations as to specific
remedies, and that since this is the view taken by the Second Circuit
majority, it cannot be correct. 24 3 Thus, he concluded that Judge Cabranes
misinterpreted Sosa, in terms of customary liability, in a way that does not
make sense.244
Judge Leval asserted that the majority opinion did not cite to any
sources which say that corporations are not subjects under international
law; rather he suggested that multiple sources say the opposite.2 4 5 He
referred to a report of the Nuremburg tribunal for a statement which
explicitly referenced juridical entities.24 6 Furthermore, and related to this,
was the finding that IG Farben was "criminal"-allowing the criminal
prosecution of its employees.2 4 7 Combining these observations with the
early opinions of the Attorneys General, Judge Leval concluded that
corporations must be considered subjects within the scope of international
law. 248
239 Id.
240 Id. at 175-76.
241 Id. at 176.
242 Id. at 176-77.
243 Id. at 178.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 180.
247 Id.; see also id. at 134 (majority opinion) ("This corporation's production of, among other things, oil,
rubber, nitrates, and fibers was harnessed to the purposes of the Nazi state, and it is no exaggeration to assert that
the corporation made possible the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Nazi Germany,
including its infamous programs of looting properties of defeated nations, slave labor, and genocide.").
248 Id. at 180-81.
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Moving along, Judge Leval then discussed how the majority, in line
with the Supreme Court's instruction in The Paquete Habana, looked to
the writings of scholars for evidence of the state of international law.24 9
Judge Leval claimed that the majority referred to no supportive scholastic
works and disregarded such material insofar as the material opposes its
viewpoint. 2 5() Again referring to the distinction between criminal and civil
law, he concluded that while "it is absolutely correct that the rules of
international law do not provide civil liability against any private actor and
do not provide for any form of liability of corporations" as referred to by
some of the majority's sources, this does not mean that the rules of
international law do not bind corporations.25 1
Despite this explication, Judge Leval's opinion was a concurrence, and
so its final part outlined the facts and history of the case and stated his
conclusion that they were insufficient to state a cause of action under the
federal pleading standards.25 2 Thus, regardless of the status of corporate
liability under customary international law, this particular action could not
proceed.
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF CASE LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL SOURCES
A. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
1. Footnote 20
The Kiobel majority first misconstrued the Supreme Court's language
when it used Footnote 20 of Sosa to make a determination of the type of
defendant liable under international law.253 The Supreme Court held that
a court must determine "whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual." 25 4
The proper meaning of this instruction is even evident from Judge
Cabranes's analysis immediately following the quotation where he notes
that States and individual people have been liable, but that corporations
249 Id. at 181.
250 Id. at 185.
251 Id. at 186.
252 Id. at 188-96.
253 Id. at 120.
254 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
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have never been liable.25 5 Interestingly, the majority's analysis seems to
imply what the majority seemed to miss, that the language of Footnote 20
only differentiates between public and private actors; the use of the phrase
"such as" serves to indicate that the Supreme Court is explaining merely
what a private actor is, not that there is a difference between types of
private actors.
Judge Leval pointed this out when he referred to the portion of the
Sosa opinion where the footnote was located.2 5 6 Therein, Justice Souter
referred to two ATS decisions and noted the issue of whether or not a
consensus existed as to a particular law being violated by, specifically,
"private actors. "257 The term, used twice in the footnote's parenthetical
and in the note itself, should have the same meaning in both places. Thus,
it appears that the majority made an unnecessary and incorrect distinction.
Later, the majority applied Justice Breyer's concurring opinion to try
to draw further meaning from Footnote 20.258 Justice Breyer wrote that
"the norm must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private
actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue."2 5 9 While the majority tried to say that this
gives further evidence of the necessary differentiation between individuals
and corporations, Justice Breyer's use of "private actor" provides no more
enlightenment than Footnote 20, and seems to repeat the principle
supporting the conflation of private parties under the ATS. Judge Leval's
statement that "far from implying that natural persons and corporations
are treated diferently for purposes of civil liability under the ATS, the
intended inference of the footnote is that they are treated identically,"2 60
assessed it well. However, in a subsequent footnote, the majority
addressed this issue, saying that the Supreme Court did not need to
differentiate between such parties,261 but this comes off as merely a weak
defense to Judge Leval's claim, and the majority quickly moved on to
other matters.
Interestingly, a subsequent amicus brief pointed out that in an opinion
referenced in neither Sosa nor Kiobel, the Supreme Court had stated that
255 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118.
256 Id. at 163-64 (Leval, J., concurring).
257 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. The cases were: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-
795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates
international law) and Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (2d Cir. 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 that
genocide by private actors violates international law).
258 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127-28.
259 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
260 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 165 (Leval, J., concurring).
261 Id. at 129 n.31 (majority opinion).
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the ATS "by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants
.... "262 There, the Court was concerned with the vitality of the ATS in
light of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but held that the ATS
retained "the same effect . .. with respect to defendants other than foreign
states." 2 63 So, while neither Sosa nor Kiobel referenced this case, it should
have some bearing on the proper interpretation of a defendant within the
bounds of the ATS and should, at minimum, suggest that the proper
reading is that which does not distinguish between private defendants.
2. Norms of International Law
In addressing whether corporate liability is a norm of international
law, the majority noted that "[t]o attain the status of a rule of customary
international law, a norm must be 'specific, universal, and obligatory.' "264
In determining what a "norm" is, the majority mentioned that the
Supreme Court instructs courts to look to "sources we have long, albeit
cautiously, recognized" such as the writings of scholars, but that the
Court also warns that "[a]greements or declarations that are merely
aspirational" are not useful.265
As to the criteria of a norm being "specific, universal, and
obligatory," the majority opinion appeared to once again mistake the
language in Sosa. In the portion of the opinion where the Supreme Court
grappled with crafting a standard to define violations, it quoted lower
courts that had dealt with ATS issues. 2 66 The Court opined that it was
"persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted." 26 7 Justice Souter called this
"generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges
who faced the issue." 2 68 Lastly, the Court used the language "sufficiently
262 Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800-cv) (arguing in support of en banc rehearing)
(quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
263 Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 438.
264 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
265 Id.
266 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33.
267 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
26 Id.
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definite to support a cause of action;" 269 "sufficiently definite" is not the
same as "specific" and "universal." It does not appear that the Supreme
Court did anything more than articulate a broad standard of judicial
analysis and, in doing so, merely offered examples of standards that have
worked for appellate courts. The Court was far from saying that the
highest standard must apply. The cautionary words of Justice Scalia's
concurrence confirm this in that they evidence his fear that the Court had
left too much leeway for lower courts in determining violations of
international law.270
Judge Leval noticed this and said that if this were the case, no civil
liability could have been extended under earlier (specifically Second
Circuit) ATS cases since "[t]here was no wide adherence among the
nations of the world to a rule of civil liability for violation of the law of
nations."2 7' And, he concluded, since the Supreme Court at no point
spoke negatively of the prior history of ATS cases which found liability,
this cannot make sense, and the Court could not have meant for that to be
inferred.272 Were the majority's reading of Sosa in this context correct, the
entire line of ATS cases that allowed suits to proceed would have been
incorrect. 2 73 Judge Leval's analysis of Sosa appears to be on point; the
majority seems to have misinterpreted it.
Judge Leval's position is further supported by an amicus brief which
argued that merely because corporations had not been subjected to
punishment for violation of international human rights norms that they
were not potentially subject to punishment for such violations.27 4 Citing the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the amici pointed out that
"international norms could not be inferred from the absence of domestic
proceedings." 27 5 The amici concluded that the ATS does not require that
international law "recognize a right to sue," and that it "requires only that
the tort be 'committed' in violation of a specific, universal, and obligatory
269 Id.
270 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
271 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 178 (Leval, J., concurring).
272 Id.
273 Id.; cf Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5-7, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800-cv) (making a similar argument to that
used by Judge Leval).
274 Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800-cv).
275 Id. at 3 n.2 (citing S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4) (first emphasis added).
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norm of international law." 276
B. Looking Inward: Second Circuit Precedent
The majority was correct that the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS had so far been undecided in the Second Circuit, 27 7 but as recently as
2009, the Second Circuit had held that a claim against a corporation could
proceed.278 In Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., one judge on the
panel, Judge Katzmann, referring to recent decisions, including Sosa,
noted that the Second Circuit has "repeatedly treated the issue of whether
corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] as indistinguishable from
the question of whether private individuals may be." 2 7 9 While the
opinion of only one judge, this conclusion deserves more weight than is
given to it by the majority opinion since it is recent and the judge who
made it was competent to analyze the circuit's recent case history in
coming to that determination.
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,280 the panel,
which included Judge Leval, did just that and accepted the rationale of
Judge Katzmann's concurrence in Khulumani to be circuit precedent.28 1
The majority and Judge Leval sparred over the meaning of Judge
Katzmann's comments in Khulumani with Judge Leval saying that Judge
Katzmann supports the idea that there is no distinction between private
actors.282
Related to the earlier discussion of Footnote 20 of Sosa and the
Supreme Court's mention of prior Second Circuit ATS cases, Judge Leval
noted that in neither of those cases did the panels "suggest[] in any way
that the law of nations might distinguish between conduct of a natural
person and of a corporation. They distinguish[ed] only between private
and State action. "283 Judge Cabranes asserted, however, that there is a
two-step analysis employed by Judge Katzmann that Judge Leval missed.284
276 Id. at 5 (emphasis removed). A similar observation was made by Judge Posner in Flono v. Firestone
Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
277 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 n.10; id. at 160 n.11 (Leval, J., concurring).
278 Id. at 161 n.12 (referring to Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009)).
279 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
280 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
281 Id. at 258.
282 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 161 n.13 (Leval, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 165.
284 Id. at 130 n.32 (majority opinion).
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Judge Cabranes stated that the second part is whether the "law would
recognize the defendants' responsibility for that violation," 2 85 but there is
nothing therein which details whether Judge Katzmann believes there to
be a viable difference between types of defendants. 8 Nothing suggests
that Judge Katzmann, whose opinion has been adopted as "the law of the
circuit," made a distinction between ATS defendants beyond the
aforementioned state actor versus non-state actor characterization.
Furthermore, an appellate judge from another circuit has read Judge
Katzmann's opinion for the proposition that corporations are liable under
the ATS.287 Judge Katzmann even opined that he believed the Supreme
Court to be "classifying both corporations and individuals as 'private
actor [s].' "288 Judge Cabranes did not address that particular point. The
majority's assertion about Judge Leval's "mistake" is, itself, mistaken.
Circuit precedent supports a finding of corporate liability under the ATS
and says nothing either explicitly or implicitly to the contrary.
C. Looking Outward: The A TS in Other Circuits
Since it determined that international law governs the scope of
inquiry, the majority did not look to any domestic sources, other than
Sosa, for guidance.28 9 If it had looked at the interpretation given to the
ATS by other circuits then it might have thought differently.
The majority should have felt compelled to make this investigation, as
it cited to Supreme Court language in The Paquete Habana which
instructed that "'where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision,' customary '[i]nternational law is part
of our law.' "290 The portion of The Paquete Habana from which the
majority drew this quote focused on general ways in which a court
making an assessment should proceed. 291' That Court suggested looking to
scholars where other helpful sources were lacking.29 2 The Kiobel majority
285 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
286 Id. at 270-71.
287 Id. at 289 (Hall, J., concurring) ("I share Judge Katzmann's understanding, . that private parties
and corporate actors are subject to liability under the ATCA.").
28 Id. at 283 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20
(2004)).
289 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125.
290 Id. at 125 n.26 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
291 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
292 Id. at 700-01.
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interpreted the Sosa Court's reading of The Paquete Habana to avoid
writings which were merely "aspirational." 293 Such a reading is reasonable
and desirable; it is more likely to produce accurate results. For purposes of
developing an understanding of international legal matters, it would make
sense that case law from other courts on the same or similar issue would
also be beneficial, and certainly not "aspirational." The Supreme Court
itself looked for some guidance from appellate courts which had handled
ATS claims. 29 4 Thus, recent cases from other Courts of Appeal should
have carried some weight in the panel's determination of relevant law.
Judge Leval recognized several instances where other courts found
corporate liability under the ATS; two cases which he noted are
particularly relevant.29 5 However, he did not go into them in any detail.2 96
His goal in citing to Romero v. Drummond Company seems similar to when
he discussed older Second Circuit cases which had simply assumed
corporate liability. 29 7 The majority's reaction to Romero would likely have
been similar to its dismissing the relevance of prior Second Circuit cases
that had assumed liability2 98 since the underlying precedent did not truly
address corporate liability. 299 The majority may also have pointed out that
the Eleventh Circuit did not analyze corporate liability under customary
international law."oo Either way, the absence of any discussion of Romero is
noticeable.
Judge Leval could have used the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Doe I v.
Unocal Corp. to support his argument as the panel there explicitly
combined all private parties into one category3 o' before addressing their
liability under the ATS.3 02 The majority's rebuttal to this would likely
have been a rehashing of its analysis of Sosa's Footnote 20, arguing that the
293 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131.
294 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).
2 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 161 nn.12 & 14 (LevalJ. concurring). The most important of the casesJudge
Leval referred to are Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cit. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th
Cit. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cit. 2005) and Romero v. Drummond, Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th
Cit. 2008).
296 His citations of them served only to provide examples; he made no citations to their legal reasoning.
297 See supra Parts II.A.4, IV.B.
2 See supra Part IV.B.
2" See supra Part II.B.2.
3o Compare supra Part II.C.2 with Parts Ill.C and III.D.
301 See supra text accompanying note 58.
32 See supra Part II.B.1. At least one sitting Second Circuit judge has accepted the aiding and abetting
rationale expressed therein. See Khulumam v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 287 (2d Cit. 2007) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
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Ninth Circuit panel misinterpreted the Supreme Court's opinion.30 3
Nevertheless, the Doe I panel's gloss of the term "party" lends further
support to the conclusion that the Supreme Court did not intend to
suggest that there is a difference between types of private parties under the
ATS. 304
The Second Circuit is the most experienced court at handling ATS
matters, however, it is not the only one. Based upon a review of decisions
rendered by other Courts of Appeal, both the majority and Judge Leval
could have benefited their arguments and understanding of the ATS by
some reliance on the rationales expressed by other courts.
D. What the International Community Would Do
1. As Early as Nuremberg
After determining that international law "governs the scope of
liability" in ATS cases, the majority looked to determine the proper
subjects of international law.30 s It stated that a subject of international law
has "legal status, personality, rights, and duties.""o6 Judge Leval agreed
with this, but noted that this "terminology has come to mean nothing
more than asking whether the particular norm applies to the type of
individual or entity charged with violating it, as some norms apply only to
States and others apply to private non-state actors. "307
Both sides then discussed the Nuremburg tribunals and reached
different conclusions. The majority argued that "[t]he defining legal
achievement of the Nuremberg trials is that they explicitly recognized
individual liability for the violation of specific, universal, and obligatory
norms of international human rights."3 0 8 It then cited to Justice Jackson's
conclusion that the ruling "'made explicit and unambiguous what was
theretofore . . . implicit in International Law,' namely, '. . . that . . .
individuals are responsible.' "309 This, it argued, shows that international law
303 See supra Part IV.A..
3 See supra Part IV.A.1
305 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126.
306 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Pt.
11, at 70 introductory note)) (emphasis removed).
3 Id. at 179 (Leval, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
3 Id. (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President Concerning the Number War Crimes Trial
(1946), reprinted in 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 342 (1946)).
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defines who is liable under international law.io On the other hand, Judge
Leval cited to the tribunal for the proposition that corporations could be
seen as liable for violating the law of nations, thus allowing their employees
to be tried for the crimes; this, he argued, shows that corporations are
indeed seen as subjects under international law. 3 1 ' The language used by
the tribunal, explicitly referencing "juristic persons," persuasively suggests
that Judge Leval is correct.
Furthermore, the majority put a lot of weight into the fact that
neither the London Charter nor the post-World War II tribunals charged
a corporation with a crime.312 While corporations were not punished, it
does not stand for the proposition that they are not subjects and cannot be
punished. Such references could easily suggest that corporations were
recognized as subjects under international law at that time, but merely that
they were not punished in those instances.
However, even that proposition is incorrect since the entities had
already faced 'judicial death through dissolution" and therefore punishment by
the tribunal was impossible. 1 The dissolutions themselves were
accomplished by a treaty signed by the major powers.3 14 Clearly, juridical
entities were recognized; clearly, juridical entities were punished- in the
1940s.
Nor was this the only World War II-related instance where the
liability and punishment of corporations was addressed. At the Potsdam
310 Id.
311 Id. at 180 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing VIII TRIAL S OF WAR CRIMINAlS BEFORE TiHE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1952) "Where private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to
exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former owner,
such action, not being expressly justified . . . , is in violation of international law . . . . Similarly where a private
individual or ajuristic person becomes a party to unlawful confiscation of public or private property by planning and
executing a well-defined design to acquire such property permanently, acquisition under such circumstances
subsequent to the confiscation constitutes conduct in violation of [international law].").
312 Id. at 134-35 (majority opinion).
313 Brief for Nuremberg Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 06-4800-cv) (arguing in support of en banc rehearing).
314 Id. at 9 (citing Agreenent Betiveen Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of Anerica, and
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional
Requirements to Be Inposed on Gennany, Art. 38, reprinted in Supplement: Official Documents, 40 Am. 1. INT'i. L.
1, 29 (1946) (Article 38 reads: "The National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) is completely and finally
abolished and declared to be illegal.")); see also 1 OPPENHEFIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1204 (Sir Robert Jennings
& Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) ("[Rielatively extensive participation in a treaty, coupled with a subject
matter of general significance and stipulations which accord with the general sense of the international
community, do establish for some treaties . . . assist the acceptance of the treaty's provisions as customary
international law.").
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and Yalta Conferences, the parties contemplated the "dismantling [of]
Germany's industrial assets,"31s the "dissolution of private
corporations, "316 the "seizure of industrial factories," " and the
"restitution of confiscated properties and reparations to both the states and
individuals who had suffered harm."31" The seizure of Farben's assets was
a penalty "as drastic as any that could be imposed on a juristic entity." 3
1
Considering this evidence, it cannot be said that corporations were
not seen as subject to, and punishable by, international law. They simply
faced a different kind of punishment from the private actors associated
with them.3 20 The majority's contention that customary international law
"has never extended the scope of liability to a corporation "321 cannot be
taken seriously.
2. Recent Developments
The impact and scope of international law has grown since the
Nuremberg tribunals, and to exemplify this, Judge Leval cited a string of
Second Circuit cases where the court allowed international law claims to
be brought by juridical entities against Cuba.32 2 How could a corporation
bring suit against another nation for a violation of international law if it
were not recognized as a subject of international law? Judge Leval
answered, correctly, that they could not; they must be subjects of
international law.32 3
The trial judge in Talisman noted that "precedent from the European
Court of Justice has held that corporations may be held liable for human
rights violations such as discrimination." 324 This same judge observed that
315 Id. at 10.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 10-11.
318 Id. at 11.
319 Id. at 12.
320 See id. at 14.
321 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
322 Id. at 181 n.37 (Leval, J., concurring) (Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1987); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), superseded by statute, 22 U.S.C. S 2370(e)(2)).
323 Id. at 181.
324 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(citing Case 36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 1419; Case 43/75,
Defrenne v. Soci6t6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation Arienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 457-63.).
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"[e]xtensive Second Circuit precedent further indicates that actions
under the ATCA against corporate defendants for such substantial
violations of international law . . . are the norm rather than the
exception." 32 5 His summation seems justified by the prior decisions of the
Second Circuit. Such examples serve to further Judge Leval's assertion
that corporations are subjects of international law.
In summarizing another difference between the majority opinion and
Judge Leval's, Judge Cabranes noted that "corporate liability is not a norm
that we can recognize and apply in actions under the A TS because the
customary international law of human rights does not impose any form of
liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise)."3 26 To this, Judge
Leval responded, the international tribunals which have been established,
such as the one at Nuremburg that declared Farben to be a criminal
organization, have not had jurisdiction to award civil damages against
anyone, much less a corporation. 3 27 The reason for this has already been
shown above.
Judge Leval made no assertion that customary international law
mandates the imposition of damages on defendants, but stated that such
matters are for the individual nations to determine and that the US,
through the ATS, has made its determination in favor of awarding
damages. 3 28 Then he added that "the basic position of international law
with respect to civil liability is that States may impose civil compensatory
liability on offenders, or not, as they see fit." 329
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that "what is a crime in one
jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction, and this distinction is
therefore of little help in ascertaining the standards of international human
rights law." 330 Also, burdens of proof in international criminal law are
often similar to American civil standards, blurring any kind of clear
325 Id. at 319.
326 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 147 (majority opinion).
327 Id. at 183 (Leval, J., concurring).
328 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2013).
329 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 172 (Leval, J., concurring); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 172 n.28 (citing Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. 0, 81-1
(1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (obligating state parties "to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide") (emphasis added).
3 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cit. 2002) (citing Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:
A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Renedies for International Human R(ghts Violations, 27 YAiI
J. INTi L. 1, 44-46 (2002)).
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line.3 3  Lastly, the panel there noted that lower courts "are increasingly
turning to the decisions by international criminal tribunals for instructions
regarding the standards of international human rights law under our civil
ATCA."332 The line of demarcation seems to be, at best, foggy.
Therefore, because the United States is "[a] legal culture long
accustomed to imposing liability on corporations,"3 3 3 it makes a certain
amount of sense that Congress could choose to impose civil liability on
them for violations of customary international law. Finally, and in line
with the above, leaving determinations of civil liability to the various
nations meshes with the various international laws that leave criminal
punishment of juridical entities to the determination of the various
states. An American statute to that effect would not be an outlier.
E. Guidance from "the Works ofJurists and Commentators"
The Supreme Court has said that courts should look to "the works of
jurists and commentators" for "trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is." 33  In Sosa, the Court said that Alvarez did not carry his burden
of using these sources to demonstrate that his treatment violated any
international norms. 33 6 Judge Cabranes cited to minimal scholarly sources
to support his argument. He referred to the affidavits of two international
law professors for the proposition that "customary international law does
not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms" and "no
331 Id.
332 Id.
3 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 (majority opinion).
334 Id. at 169 n.23 (Leval, J., concurring) ("Several international conventions explicitly recognize the
diversity in nations' domestic laws regarding the imposition of criminal sanctions on legal or juridical persons.
These conventions require State parties to impose criminal sanctions on legal persons, or where that is not possible
under the individual nation's domestic law, non-criminal sanctions. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, G.A.
Res. 54/263, Annex 11, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into
force Jan. 18, 2002 ("Subject to the provisions of its national law, each State Party shall take measures . . . to
establish the liability of legal persons. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, such liability of legal
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative."); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions, art. 3, Nov.
21, 1997, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, entered into force Feb. 15, 1999 ("The bribery of a foreign public official shall
be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.. . . In the event that under the legal
system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall ensure that legal persons
shall be subject to effective, proportional and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions.")).
3s Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900)).
336 Id. at 737. He referred to only one such source.
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international judicial tribunal has so far recognized corporate liability, as
opposed to individual liability, in a civil or criminal context on the basis of a
violation of the law of nations or customary international law."m3  Judge
Leval pointed out that the question that derived this answer asked only
whether the professor knew of a decision recognizing corporate liability for
a violation of the law of nations, and not for him to make an assertion as to
the state of international law.3 38 The professor, Judge Leval added, even
said:
When the terms of an international treaty become part of the law
of a given state-whether (as in most common law jurisdictions) by
being enacted by parliament [i.e., Congress enacting the ATS]
. . . corporations may be civilly liable for wrongful conduct contrary to the
enacted terms of the treaty just as they may be liable for any other
conduct recognized as unlawful by that legal system.3 3 9
This, would, if anything, support Judge Leval's opinion. 3 4 0 The majority
opinion cited two treatises and the Restatement, but Judge Leval noted
that in none of these sources did the majority find anything which
supported the principle of no corporate liability under customary
international law. 34 ' He pointed out that if this were the case, strange as it
seemed to him, that these authors would have made such a notation.3 42
This is an interesting and valid point.
The majority referred to a 2009 book for the proposition that "despite
trends to the contrary, the view that international law primarily regulates
States, and in limited instances such as international criminal law,
individuals, but not [transnational corporations], is still the prevailing one
among international law scholars."3 4 3 Judge Leval, reading further, found
that:
3 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143 (majority opinion) (citing Decl. ofJames Crawford 10, Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009)).
338 Id. at 182 (Leval, J., concurring). This is also corroborated by the amicus brief submitted by the
International Law Scholars. See Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7-
12, Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (No. 06-4800-cv) (arguing that international law supports the awarding of damages and
obliges states to enact remedies for its violations).
3 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 183 (quoting Decl. ofJames Crawford 1 4) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. at 183-84.
341 Id. at 181-82 (referring to the majority opinion's citations to Oppenheim's Intenational Law and
Brierley's The Law of Nations).
342 Id.
343 Id. at 143 (majority opinion) (quoting MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RI5SPONSIBILiTY UNDER
TiE ATS 196 (2009)) (alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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'[T]he ATS, although incorporating international law, is still
governed by and forms part of torts law which applies equally to
natural and legal persons unless the text of a statute provides
otherwise,' and that international law does not prevent a State
'from raising its standards by holding [transnational corporations]
which are involved [in] or contribute to violations of
international law liable as long as the cause of international law is
served because international law leaves individual liability (as
opposed to State liability), be it of a natural or a legal person,
largely to domestic law.'3 44
Following this, it is evident that according to an author cited by the
majority, a state may hold a corporate defendant liable for a breach of the
law of nations. Judge Leval also cited that text for the statement that "the
ATS 'applies equally to natural and legal persons' and that international
law does not bar States from imposing liability on a corporation, as
international law leaves civil liability to domestic law."34 5 Here, again,
Judge Leval had the stronger argument.
Judge Leval cited another scholar who, in 2009, wrote that "[a]lleged
perpetrators of crimes under international law that do not require any
showing of state action, including piracy, genocide, crimes against
humanity, enslavement, and slave trading, can be sued under the ATS.
Generally, the prospective private defendants can be individuals, corporations, or
other entities.""' Note that there is no distinction made; it does not appear
that one is necessary. This is in line with the plain reading of Footnote 20,
Justice Breyer's concurrence, and the pre-Kiobel cases which assumed
corporate liability.
Finally, he noted that while the majority opinion dismissed some
scholarly opinions as aspirational, in reality they are not.4 For example,
Judge Cabranes quoted Professor Ratner saying that "the universe of
international criminal law does not reveal any prosecutions of
corporations per se . . . ."3 However, Professor Ratner's sentence
concluded: "an important precedent nonetheless shows the willingness of
key legal actors to contemplate corporate responsibility at the
344 Id. at 172 n.38 (quoting KOEBELE, supra note 343, at 208).
3s Id. at 181 n.38 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting KOEBELE, supra note 343, at 208).
346 Id. at 185 (quoting PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ATS: LAw, HISTORY, AND
ANALYSIs 215 (2009)).
7 See id. at 185 n.45; see also id. at 143 n.48 (majority opinion).
348 Id. at 143-44 (quoting Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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international level."3 4 Professor Ratner discussed I.G. Farben and its war
crimes trials before noting that the court made continued reference to
corporations, including Farben, having "responsibilities," "obligations,"
and "duties" that they had breached.3 "so The majority made this same
contention.3 5 ' This lends credence to Judge Leval's later quotation of
Professor Ratner for the surnmation that "international law has already
effectively recognized duties of corporations." 352 Thus, the claim that the
author is "aspirational" is refuted by examples supplied by the author
himself.
F. The Earliest Interpretations
Two opinions issued by United States Attorneys General pull in favor
of corporations being subjects of international law for ATS purposes.3 53 A
1907 opinion interpreted the ATS to say that an American corporation
could be held liable. 354 A 1795 opinion advised that a British company
could sue under the ATS.3 ' The ATS was enacted in 1789. The Attorney
General's opinion only six years later bears significant weight in
interpreting the statute.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court spoke approvingly of the 1795
opinion. 5 6 This is contrary to the Kiobel majority's assessment that
"neither opinion does anything more than baldly declare that a
corporation can sue under the ATS . . . or that a corporation can be sued
under the ATS" and "neither opinion gives any basis for its assumptions
about customary international law." 5 7 The Supreme Court's comments
suggest that courts should give weight to these opinions.
349 Ratner, supra note 348, at 477.
35 Id. at 477-78.
351 See supra text accompanying note 180 ("legal status, personality, rights, and duties").
352 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 185 n.45 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting Ratner, supra note 348, at 475) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
353~ See supra Parts Ill.C-D.
354 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 180.
35 Id.
356 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004) (the Attorney General "made it clear that a
federal court was open for the prosecution of a tort action . . ."); see also supra notes 106-08.
3 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142 n.44 (majority opinion).
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V. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY, OR:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT DODGED THE ISSUE OF CORPORATE
LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. A Brief Procedural History of Kiobel at the Supreme Court
While the long procedural history of Kiobel's time at the Supreme
Court is well-summarized in the Court's opinion, 35 8 a brief overview is
helpful. The Court first granted certiorari on October 17, 201 13 on the
question of whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability. 36 0
The oral argument, however, focused heavily on the question of the
extraterritorial application of the ATS.3 6 ' This line of inquiry was spurred
by a question from Justice Alito: "What business does a case like this have
in the courts of the United States?" 362  The Court then ordered
reargument on that issue. 6
Shortly after this second round of arguments, the Court issued its
unanimous judgment, 6 based squarely on the issue of the extraterritorial
3s8 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
3 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
360 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. In full, the questions were:
1. Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C.
S 1350, is a merits question, as it has been treated by all courts prior to the decision below, or an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for the first time.
2. Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations such as
torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decisions provides, or if
corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS for
such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held.
361 Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel Alien Tort Statute Reargument in SCOTUS Today, TiE VOiLOKi
CONsIRAcY, (Oct. 1, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/10/01/kiobel-alien-tort-stature-
reargument-in-scotus-today/.
362 Kali Borkoski, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: What's at stake, and for whom?, SCOTUSBLOc (Sept.
30,2012,9:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-whats-at-stake-and-
for-whom/.
363 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) ("Whether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.").
36 The opinion of the Court was delivered by ChiefJustice Roberts and was joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Separate concurrences were filed by: Justice Kennedy; Justice Alito, joined by
Justice Thomas; and Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
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application of American laws.36 s For reasons that are not entirely clear, 6
the Court's opinion made no reference to the original question of
corporate liability3 67 or to the oft-cited Footnote 20 from Sosa.368 This is
not to argue that by deciding Kiobel on extraterritoriality grounds was
improper in any way-in fact, the Court's decision was based on strong
jurisprudential bases and separation of powers considerations.3 69  There
will doubtless be numerous suppositions and theories put forth as to the
reasons underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel, but for the
present, it is sufficient that the Court left the issue thoroughly undecided.
B. Where Are We?
Justifiable prudential concerns aside, the Supreme Court initially
granted certiorari in this case on the explicit grounds of resolving the issue
of corporate tort liability under the ATS, and that issue remains
365 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). The extraterritoriality issue
likely developed from Chief Judge Jacobs's comments immediately following the panel decision where, upon
consideration of rehearing, he cited "judicial imperialism" and international concerns as reasons why the court
should not impose ATS liability. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011).
366 It is possible that the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue of corporate liability in an effort to avoid
much of the scrutiny that accompanied its decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Conn'n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010). See Nicole Flatow Supreme Court Widens Scope of Case on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights,
ACSBiO, (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/supreme-court-widens-scope-of-case-on-corporate-
accountability-for-human-rights ("A case that started out as potentially the most significant test of corporate
personhood since Citizens United v. FEC (sic) may now be decided on other grounds.") (citing Dahlia Lithwick,
justice on the High Seas, SLATE, (Feb. 28, 2012, 7:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/
supremecourt_dispatches/2012/02/thesuprenmecourtconsiders whether royaldutch.shell is immune
fromihabiity for human-rightsabuses becauserit-is-a corporation_.single.html).
367 See Kristin Linsley Myles & James Rutten, Kiobel commentary: Answers . . . and more questions,
SCOTUSni oc (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-kiobel-answers-
and-more-questions/.
36s See supra Part IV.A.1. In Flono v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011), Judge
Posner makes light of what he views to be the hyper-importance that litigants place on Supreme Court footnotes.
Id. at 1017. But then again, "footnotes are the next closest creature to 'poetry' in Constitutional Law." Professor
Ruthann Robson, "Constitutional Footnotes: A Month of Footnotes Starting with the Most Famous Footnote," CONST.
L. PROF BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conaw/2011/04/-constitutional-footnotes-a-
nonth-of-footnotes-starting-with-the-msost-famous-footnote.html.
36) The presumption against the extraterritorial application of American law "provides that '[wihen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.'' Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878
(2010)). The Court continued: "[t]his presumption 'serves to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."' Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). It is well-established that foreign policy considerations are best left
to the executive and legislative branches. See, e.g., id.
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undecided. When the Court granted certiorari, there was a division
among the Courts of Appeal on that precise issue.370 In the wake of the
Court's decision, that split remains. That the Court left the issue of
corporate tort liability under the ATS unresolved poses significant issues
for corporations operating abroad.
The divide over corporate ATS liability is even more pronounced
when considering the split among the judges of the Second Circuit.
Following the panel decision in Kiobel, the en banc vote was a split of the
ten active members of the court. The essence of Judge Leval's
concurrence was felt in the opinions of the judges that dissented from the
denial of en banc rehearing.3 7 ' The opinions noted the new circuit split
between the Second and Eleventh Circuits, and he stated that "the panel
majority opinion is very likely incorrect as to whether corporations may
be found civilly liable under the Alien Tort Statute. "372
The truly interesting opinion was Judge Katzmann's which noted the
dispute between Judges Cabranes and Leval over the meaning of his
concurrence in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd.17 3 He said that he
"see[s] no inconsistency between the reasoning of my opinion in
Khulumani and Judge Leval's well-articulated conclusion, with which I fully
agree, that corporations, like natural persons, may be liable for violations of
the law of nations under the ATCA."3 74 There could not have been a
better way of showcasing the differences between the judges of the
Second Circuit.
The existing circuit split, combined with sharp division within the
Second Circuit-a highly-regarded authority on the ATS, speaks to the
importance of review and clarification of an increasingly important issue
and the need for congressional action.
370 See supra Part lI.B.
371 One of the opinions was that ofJudge Katzmann, whose concurring opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), was adopted as circuit precedent and the meaning of which was
disputed by Judges Cabranes and Leval in Kiobel. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
372 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
373 Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
374 Id. (emphasis added).
37s William S. Dodge, Kiobel Insta-Symposium:TDre (sic) Pyrrhic Victory of the Bush Administration Position in
Kiobel, OPINIOJURIs (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:13 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/23/kiobel-insta-symposiunthe-
pyrrhic-victory-of-the-bush-administration-position-in-kiobel/.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Future of ATS Litigation
In the time since the Second Circuit's decision, Kiobel and corporate
tort liability has been a hot topic, and the Supreme Court's decision did
not, as many predicted, put a definitive end to corporate ATS liability. 7
In the aftermath of the Second Circuit's decision, multiple ATS suits
against corporations were dismissed citing its rationale"'- the impact was
immediate."' It was called "a blockbuster opinion that could spell the end
of the vast bulk of ATS litigation.""' Though it was only one decision,
the Second Circuit's deep history with the ATS lends its Kiobel decision
great weight nationwide.38" And, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision, the corporate liability exception remains the law of the Second
Circuit,"' but corporate liability under the ATS remains law in the
Seventh,38 2 Ninth," and Eleventh 8 . Circuits.
B. Final Thoughts
The ATS was an Act of Congress-the first Congress. Whether the
376 Compare Samp, supra note 11 with Nathan Koppel, Goodbye Alien Torts? Second Circuit Blows Hole in
1789 Law, WAiL SrREETJouRNA, LAw Bioc (Sept. 17, 2010, 3:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/
17/goodbye-alien-torts-second-circuit-blows-hole-in-1789-law/ ("Corporate America can breath (sic) a whole
lot easier") and Julian Ku, Goodbye to the A TS? Second Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability for Violations of Customary
International Law, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 17, 2010 1:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org.
3n See, e.g., Flono v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., No. 1:06-cv-00627-JMS-TAB, 2010 WL 4174583
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2010), affd on othergrounds, Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir.
2011); Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495-RLY-DML 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010);
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., No. 10 Civ 5646(SR), 2010 WL 4967827 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010); Liu Bo Shan
v. China Construction Bank Corp., No. 10-2992-cv, 2011 WL 1681995 (2d Cit. May 5, 2011).
378 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 376.
3 Ku, supra note 376.
380 See Glenn Lammi, High Court's Denial of Cert a De Facto Endorsement of Recent Alien Tort Statute
Ruling
2
?, Ti-iE LEGAL PULSE (Oct. 4, 2010), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2010/10/04/high-courts-denial-of-cert-a-
de-facto-endorsement-of-recent-alien-tort-statute-ruling/.
381 John Bellinger, Reflections on Kiobel, LAWFARE (April 22, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.
com/2013/04/reflections-on-kiobel/.
382 In a case decided subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel, the Seventh Circuit decided
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.), which affirmed on other
grounds the District Court's opinion in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., No. 1:06-cv-00627-JMS-TAB,
2010 WL 4174583 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2010) (dismissing ATS suit against corporate defendant due to corporate
exemption).
383 Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); see discussion supra Part 1I.B.1.
384 Romero v. Drummond Company, Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); see discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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Act remains relevant over 200 years later, to what causes of action it
applies, and to which actors it applies has shown to be a topic ill-suited to
the determination of the judicial branch. The courts that have spoken on
the ATS's applicability to corporations have produced mixed results. If
there is anything more difficult for a business to plan for, it is uncertainty.
The appeal to the Supreme Court could have produced just such
certainty, but it did not. As a result, the courts of the United States remain
divided over the issue of corporate ATS liability, and the best way to
achieve uniformity would be for an Act of Congress to clarify the purpose
and objectives of the Alien Tort Statute.
Regardless, the ultimate determination on the earth-shattering issue
of whether the courts of the United States should hear cases such as Kiobel
carnes immense policy implications and involves substantial separation of
powers issues. Such a determination should be made by Congress-not
the courts.
